


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~~SECRET~~**138. Changing Soviet Policy Toward the Afro-Asian Areas**

Soviet policy toward Afro-Asian countries is changing once more. This is in line with a definite pattern of subjugation. The Stalin policy of dividing the world into two blocs, the Socialist camp and the "Imperialist" camp, which included the Afro-Asian areas, was officially modified by Khrushchev. At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 he spoke of a "vast zone of peace" made up of "peace-loving states" of the Afro-Asian areas and the countries of the Communist bloc. Their common interest was defense against the "Imperialist camp." This division of the world into three areas was aimed at absorbing the Afro-Asian countries in the Soviet Orbit in two stages. The goal of the first phase was to remove these countries from dependence on the "Imperialists." Soviet propaganda concentrated on anti-Colonialism, stressing the virtues of neutrality and appealed to all groups to form a united national front. At times, as in wooing the UAR, the Soviets even appeared willing to sacrifice the position of the Syrian Communist Party in order to parade as champions of Arab unity. The second phase, launched late in 1958, and more clearly defined at the 21st Soviet Party Congress in early 1959, has for its goal the drawing of these countries into the Soviet Orbit. In Soviet propaganda to these countries the slogans of independence and neutrality have been replaced by talk of national liberation and of the struggle between progressive and reactionary forces. As previously tested in East Europe after WW II, the "salami tactics" of chipping at the "national front" until only the Communists and their sympathizers are left, is to be applied to these countries. Instead of showing willingness to sacrifice the local Communist parties the Soviets are again giving them support and label them the only progressive and truly patriotic forces. Inside the Soviet Union the Party propagandists who presented Nasser, Sukarno, and Nehru as national heroes have again started to criticize them as susceptible to "imperialist" influence.

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~~SECRET~~**139. Krishna Menon**

Krishna Menon is the Chairman of India's UNGA delegation and Nehru's Minister of Defense. His presence at the UN characterized by his sharp tongue, his pro-Communist orientation, his desire to occupy the center of the international stage, the antagonism he inspires amongst others, and his continuing bitter attacks on the free world and its policies, has been a major source of friction in relations with India. Menon has been a major vehicle for Nehru's policy of neutralism and mediation between power blocs and, indeed, has been reported reliably to have exceeded his mandates. (Menon voted against the condemnation of Russian aggression in Hungary, and in so doing violated the instructions of his government which were to abstain). He has been noticeably reticent in the face of Chinese provocations on the Indian border and the problems created by the Communist Party in Kerala. He has had a long career of association with leftist elements and policies. The CPI unofficially supported Menon in the elections of 1957; he has denounced SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and the Western positions on disarmament, nuclear tests, Korea, Indo-China, and Formosa. The sole source of his political strength apart from the CPI is his close relationship to Nehru. He has so many enemies in the Indian Civil Service, the Congress Party, and the armed services, that he would not survive Nehru's departure from the Indian political arena. This month Menon was involved in a dispute with General Thimmaya, Commander in Chief. Thimmaya's proffered resignation was refused by Nehru. 5X1

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~~SECRET~~**140. Suggested Indo-Pakistan Alliance**

Advocacy of a defensive alliance between India and Pakistan in the face of Chicom threats is once again being advanced by Pakistan. The suggestion was first made on 27 April 1959 by the Pakistan President Mohammed Ayub Khan and is being repeated by him. Ayub saw Premier Nehru in New Delhi while enroute to Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, from Karachi. On the earlier occasion, Nehru (who has said that he does not like "warlike" alliances) turned down the idea, as no doubt he will again. However, Ayub seems to be hopeful that Nehru will change his mind because of the Chicom menace to the Indian northern areas. "I do not foresee," Ayub says, "another Jawaharlal (Nehru) being produced in India in the foreseeable future. Therefore, let us take advantage of the situation and evolve ways and means for good neighborliness." Ayub, who as a career military officer and Commander-in-Chief has for many years lectured Pakistani (and some American) audiences on military strategy, is worried about the long-term Chicom threat. Perhaps hoping that the Indians may be at least as worried as he, Ayub is pressing for agreement on joint defense of the respective northern borders and hopes for agreement on other matters which have long plagued Indo-Pakistani relations. According to a Nepalese newspaper, the High Commissioner of Pakistan in New Delhi has reportedly suggested to the Nepalese Ambassador that the Chicom menace to their respective borders be discussed between Pakistan and Nepal. The same editor states that the Nepal Government has proposed that a common policy in this matter be discussed by the areas of the sub-continent concerned, namely Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bhutan and Sikkim.

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**141. Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the People's Republic of China**

The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China will begin on 1 October 1959 at Peking. This event should be challenging to Chinese leadership in view of the cataclysmic changes wrought by the "great leap forward," the subjugation of Tibet, the invasion of Laos, the Indian-Chinese border disputes, the "admissions" of inaccurate production statistics as much as 35% off in some major sectors, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits and the recent important changes in the Communist hierarchy. Proclamations will probably be made concerning the "heroic character of Chinese Communist nationalism" and its role in the "fraternal march" toward building a Communist world. Premier Khrushchev and Mikhail Suslov, other bloc and Communist Party leaders and some socialist party leaders will be in attendance to offer congratulations. Suslov is a hard-bitten Stalinist doctrinaire who undoubtedly opposes the communal program and other Chicom deviations more vehemently than Khrushchev. Since Khrushchev will not have arrived for the opening ceremonies Suslov will represent him and speak on behalf of the Soviet delegation. The subordination of Communist bloc foreign policies to the higher goals of International Communism is anticipated. The anniversary is expected, however, to be primarily a glorification of Mao and Communist China, stressing "national liberation" from "imperialism" and the giant strides made toward a Communist "utopia" since that time. Economic progress allegedly brought about by the communal program and the "great leap forward" campaign will be lauded and statistical miscalculation revealed in the Communiqué will be explained away. The role of the so-called "rightist opportunist" in impeding progress in the economic field probably will not be emphasized as the result of the recent amnesty granted to "rightists." It is not anticipated that the recent changes in the hierarchy will be given much attention. A bid for the loyalty of the overseas Chinese will undoubtedly be made. Although the anniversary will be concerned with "glorious" Chinese achievements of the past ten years, it is believed worldwide Communist solidarity and purpose will be clearly demonstrated.

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On 4 September, Laos accused Communist North Vietnam (DRV) of flagrant aggression, and requested a UN emergency force. The US immediately supported UN consideration of Laos' appeal and placed the ultimate blame for the crisis on Moscow and Hanoi. The UN Security Council on 8 September created a sub-committee to investigate the Laotian situation; this arrived in Vientiane in mid-September. At least an interim report is expected within three weeks. Washington has rejected Moscow call for an emergency meeting of the Geneva powers to settle the crisis. This conference supposedly would base its findings on the report of a reconstituted ICC. There has been claimed that the UN team has been sent to pave the way for aggression by North Vietnam, the US, under the UN flag. The UN action also is denounced as a violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Pathet Lao/Royal Lao Government Agreements of November 1957. The Laotian rebels have announced through Hanoi their willingness to negotiate a settlement with Laos on the basis of the Geneva and November 1957 agreements. This is a re-phrasing of their earlier demands for the return of the ICC and the withdrawal of alleged US arms and bases. Military activity has subsided somewhat since the UN decision. However, it is too early to view this as a definite indication that the DRV has decided to discontinue military activity. Meanwhile, the US has moved in increased quantities of supplies to strengthen RLG forces.

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~~SECRET~~**143. Yugoslavia's Record Grain Harvest**

During the period subsequent to the Stalin-Tito rift in 1948, despite continued emphatic protests of adherence to classic Marx-Leninist doctrine, the Yugoslav regime undertook a series of reforms in domestic policies. One of the most unique of these and one which represents a complete deviation from standard Communist theology and practice was the decollectivization of agriculture carried out in the period 1952-1953. Collectivization had, as in the cases of the rest of Eastern Europe, proved a failure in Yugoslavia, both because of its inherent inefficiency and the implacable resistance of the peasant. Thus the Yugoslavs established a system of voluntary cooperatives of the West European variety including peasant ownership of the land, no forced deliveries, produce distribution on a free-market basis, and Government capital investment in cooperative heavy farm equipment, supplies, and fertilizers. In September of this year the Yugoslav Government announced a record harvest (wheat, corn, and rye) which would not only result in a grain surplus for the first time since the end of the war and a cancellation of wheat imports, but also represents an overfulfillment of the current agricultural goals to the extent that the goals of the five year plan 1957-1961 will be attained by the end of 1960. A new plan must therefore be prepared this fall rather than next. Many factors have contributed to this striking success. A new Italian seed introduced by the UN Technical Assistance Agency to the Yugoslav wheat farmers is largely responsible for a harvest of 4,030,060 tons in 1959 as opposed to 2,450,000 tons in 1958. The adoption of a hybrid corn resulted in a harvest this year of 7,000,000 tons as opposed to 3,950,000 tons in 1958. Partially as a result of US aid and following the withdrawal of Soviet aid, fertilizer plants are being constructed in Yugoslavia and their output will replace the recently increased imports of fertilizer which has contributed to good farming techniques by the Yugoslav peasant and has added to his feeling of confidence in the government's real interest in his increased productivity under a free system. Finally, extremely favorable weather conditions permitted all these factors to work to their best advantage. Thus the Yugoslav agricultural sector, which in 1951, under a rigid and doctrinaire collective system along the Soviet model, produced a total grain crop of approximately 6,597,360 tons has, in 1959, under a system of independent farming, western-style cooperatives, and free marketing produced a grain harvest of 11,297,060 tons.

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**144. Non-Communist Foreign Students in Soviet Bloc Schools**

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet policy of excluding students from non-Communist countries has been reversed. The goal of the new policy is to expose foreign nationals to the Communist way of life and, as the Czechoslovakian Minister of Culture has stated, "to return them to their homelands as dedicated advocates of socialist ideas." In 1958 about 2,700 foreign nationals, mostly from the Free World, attended Soviet bloc schools, the preponderant number going to schools in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. The heaviest quotas came from the United Arab Republic (800); Algeria (500); Greece (230); Indonesia (145); and the Sudan (93); with lesser representation from 34 other countries. On balance, the program has been beneficial to the over-all Communist cause; good will has been generated with recipient governments and the average student has probably formed a favorable impression of the vigor and progress of Communist society. On the other hand, a considerable number of foreign students are bitterly resentful of constant interference with their personal and academic freedom. This has included frequent denial of access to research facilities; refusal of permits for travel connected with studies; racial discrimination, including a display of color prejudice by individual Soviets - especially those of the Komsomol against black Africans; censorship of mail, surveillance by student informers and explicit policing of their activities by Komsomol brigades; proscription of Embassy-student contacts; harassment over foreign currency exchange; enforced attendance at Communist rallies; harassment of Russian girl friends; provocations and attempts at recruitment for propaganda and intelligence purposes. Students have fought back. The black Africans formed their own student union. When harassed, the Arabs went on strike. When sufficiently goaded, even governments have taken action. For your information only: The UAR recently cancelled 21 scholarship grants from the Soviet bloc and is currently attempting to transfer some students from the USSR to the USA.

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